

FRAMING RECONCILIATION STRATEGIES IN WESTERN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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This paper analyses the use of the reconciliation strategy in Western political leaders' rhetoric in the modern era, and how they are linguistically realised and accomplished rhetorically. The study attempts to establish what communicative tools political leaders use to manage social tension, restore public trust, and forge unity, particularly amid socio-political unrest. Unlike earlier studies theorising reconciliation as a broad ideological goal, this research presents a practical and methodical study of its strategic application in discourse. The methodology used involves qualitative analysis of the transcripts of the political speeches delivered by eminent Western leaders such as Rishi Sunak, Joe Biden, Olaf Scholz, and others. The sample was selected according to the political status of the speakers and timeliness of their public addresses to the current affairs of the world, particularly the war waged by rF on Ukraine. The study divides the reconciliation communicative strategy into four tactics: rationalisation, acknowledging fault, appeal to shared identity, and call to cooperative action. They were examined through political discourse analysis, media framing theory, and linguistic stylistics, closely considering metaphors, epithets, and other stylistic elements. The study reveals how the leaders intentionally use these tactics to influence public opinion, make their messages more distinct, and frame complex or controversial issues in comprehensible terms. The study is significant both socially and academically: it further contributes to understanding political rhetoric as a conflict management and negotiation tool. It clarifies the persuasion mechanisms that build public consciousness. Moreover, it contributes to the ongoing debate on political discourse in linguistics and provides a foundation for future research into mediated communication and the evolving dimensions of political trust.

Key words: political discourse, reconciliation strategy, media framing, communication tactics, rhetoric, Western politicians.

Бешилей Ольга. Фреймування стратегій примирення в західному політичному дискурсі

Ця стаття досліджує застосування стратегій примирення у політичному дискурсі на основі публічних промов сучасних західних лідерів. Особливу увагу зосереджено на тому, як стратегії лінгвістично оформлені та реалізуються за допомогою риторичних тактик. Метою дослідження є визначення комунікативних інструментів, які використовуються політичними діячами для коригування суспільної напруженості, відновлення громадської довіри та сприяння єдності, особливо в часи соціально-політичних потрясінь. На відміну від попередніх досліджень, які розглядали примирення як широку ідеологічну мету, ця робота пропонує практичний та систематичний аналіз його тактичної реалізації у мовленні. Методологічна основа включає якісний аналіз стенограм політичних промов, виголошених ключовими західними лідерами, такими як Ріші Сунаком, Джо Байденом, Олаф Шольцом та іншими. Вибірка була створена на основі політичної значущості ораторів та актуальності їхніх публічних звернень до глобальних подій, зокрема нападу рф на Україну. У статті прокласифіковано стратегії примирення на чотири комунікативні тактики: раціоналізація, визнання провини, звернення до спільної ідентичності та заклик до співпраці. Ці тактики були розглянуті крізь призму аналізу політичного дискурсу та теорії медіафреймінгу з особливою увагою до використання стилістичних прийомів. Дослідження показує, як лідери стратегічно використовують ці тактики для впливу на громадську думку, підвищення чіткості своїх меседжів та формулювання складних або суперечливих питань у доступній формі. Результати є важливими як з академічної, так і з соціальної точки зору: вони поглиблюють розуміння політичної риторики як інструменту для переговорів та врегулювання

конфліктів, а також проливають світло на механізми переконання, що формують суспільну свідомість. Дослідження робить внесок у дискурс політичної лінгвістики та складає основу для подальших досліджень медіа-комунікації та динаміки конструювання політичної довіри через мовні маніпуляції.

Ключові слова: політичний дискурс, стратегія примирення, медіафреймінг, комунікативні тактики, риторика, західні політики.

Introduction. In an era of geopolitical crisis, remitted wars, and deepening social polarisations, the role of political language in reconciliation has become paramount. Formal addresses, broadcast globally across omnipresent media networks, are today no longer monologues but also powerful strategic moves meant to shape public opinion, coordinate international affairs, and stage either war or peace. The current socio-economic environment, strained with recurring crises of conflict, energy crisis, and humanitarian crisis, brings the operational imperative to understand the communicative means that could be adopted to build bridges rather than walls. This study addresses this lacuna by analysing how political leaders now employ communicative strategies of reconciliation in their official rhetoric, focusing on their tactics to construct meaning.

Political communication is institutional and strategic [1]. It employs persuasive tactics to manage ideologies, align public opinions, and bargain for power relations. Reconciliation rhetoric is central in post-conflict societies but increasingly extends to ordinary political discourse. Bruneus have defined reconciliation as “a social process that involves mutual recognition of past suffering and changing destructive behaviour to constructive relations aimed at achieving sustainable peace” [2, p. 80]. *Political Discourse Analysis* scholars have argued that language is not a neutral carrier but is the key tool for constructing political reality [3]. Political persuasion is at the core of such reality construction. As P. Chilton notes, “The essential task of political rhetoric is to construct a vision of a ‘we’ that is coherent, virtuous, and capable of overcoming the challenges posed by an ‘other’” [4, p. 45].

Political discourse in the 21st century is linked to media discourse. Speeches don’t go down unpolished; media outlets filter, edit, and *frame* them, which imparts a deep level of influence upon them as they enter the public sphere. *Media Framing Theory* posits that by highlighting certain features of a perceived reality and making them more vivid, the media can induce

a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, or treatment recommendation [5]. As J. Blommaert argues, “Conflicts are not just fought with weapons; they are narrated into existence through discourses that define victims, villains, and the moral stakes of the struggle” [6, p. 112]. The intersection of political communication and media representation has given rise to the dynamic discipline of *Media Linguistics* that researches the language and semiotic properties of media text [7; 8]. Leaders employ a specific communications strategy to reach certain political objectives, which is attained through numerous particular tactics.

Although extensive research has been done into conflict and persuasion language and cognitive and linguistic markers of conflict [9], there is no systematic study of reconciliation language strategies and tactics in contemporary political discourse.

Research objectives. This article aims to fill this gap by systematically analysing communicative reconciliation strategies in contemporary Western politicians’ public speeches. The key contribution of this study is the formulation of a workable framework for analysing reconciliatory discourse, offering insights for scholars working in political linguistics and media studies as well as for practitioners engaged in diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Results. The subsequent analysis is derived from a selected corpus of nine political speeches delivered by Western leaders during 2022-2024, specifically focusing on the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its ramifications for the international community and the EU in particular. Each speech was analysed qualitatively for the occurrence of reconciliation *strategy* and coded according to four basic communicative *tactics* (each of them are coded): **rationalisation (R)**, **acknowledgement of fault (F)**, **appeal to shared identity (I)**, and **call to shared action (A)**. However, not all of the analysed speeches included all four tactics. The research considered the stylistic devices used to enhance the persuasive and emotional potential within the specific tactics.

1. Speech by Rishi Sunak, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. In his address to the Tory conference, the Prime Minister employs several tactics to restore faith and unify his party around a new political direction.

– **R.** By stating, “*We were the first country to send long-range weapons,*” he provides a logical basis (*ethos*) for his authority, rationalising why his audience should trust his capacity to lead and deliver on future promises.

– **F.** His statement, “*there is an undeniable sense that politics just doesn’t work the way it should,*” validates shared frustration and is a crucial reconciliation that builds trust within the broader political system.

– **I.** By using the inclusive pronoun “*Our mission is to fundamentally change,*” he constructs a common identity between himself and the audience, making the mission no longer his policy but the group’s collective goal.

– **A.** Following the appeal to a shared identity, Sunak directs the audience to internal unity and action. The phrase “*it can only be us who will deliver it*” frames cooperation as an exclusive responsibility, suggesting that success depends entirely on their joint effort.

2. Speech by Joe Biden, former President of the USA. In his “State of the Union” address, Biden’s strategy is to unify a politically divided domestic audience by identifying common goals and everyday challenges.

– **R.** The speaker provides a clear cause-and-effect argument to explain economic challenges to the American people. He states that “*Putin’s unfair and brutal war in Ukraine disrupted energy supplies,*” thereby rationalising the problem of inflation as a consequence of external aggression.

– **F.** Biden’s approach involves expressing empathy and recognising the suffering of others, a key component of reconciliation. His reference to the consequences of the war, such as “*blocking all that grain in Ukraine,*” functions to acknowledge the severe impact on global stability.

– **I.** Biden appeals to a shared American identity centred on collective work and national pride. His vision of putting “*thousands of people to work rebuilding*” transcends party lines by focusing on a common project. This tactic constructs a unified “*we*” engaged in the shared goal of improving the nation’s infrastructure.

– **A.** The call for cooperation is framed with a sense of urgency and shared responsibility for

the future. With the declaration, “*We can never let that happen again,*” Biden calls for joint action to secure supply chains using a strong modal phrase “*can never*” that elevates the call from a suggestion to a national imperative.

3. Speech by Sauli Niinistö, President of Finland. In his address to the 77th UN session, President Niinistö’s rhetoric is shaped by the immediate context of the war in Ukraine, using it as a basis for a broader call for international resolve.

– **R.** The President of Finland rationalises his government’s firm stance against Russian aggression by pointing to its devastating and morally unambiguous consequences. The description of the “*sorrow and destruction to the sovereign lands*” of Ukraine is a powerful appeal to *pathos*.

– **I.** Niinistö fosters a collective identity based on resilience and shared moral obligation, insisting that the international community “*can and should emerge stronger from this crisis.*” The use of the modal verbs “*can*” (highlighting potential) and “*should*” (highlighting duty) frames the audience as a unified body capable of overcoming adversity together.

– **A.** The call is issued with an apparent urgency, as the statement “*time to show global solidarity*” is a direct and unambiguous summons. It frames joint action not as an option to be considered but as an immediate test of the international community’s commitment.

4. Speech by Anna Beate Thinner, Minister of Norway. This speech at the 78th UN conference focused on condemning the violation of international law and calling for a specific, principled approach to peace.

– **R.** The argument is grounded in a legal framework, an appeal to the shared rules of the international order. By stating that Russia has “*violated fundamental principles of international law,*” she rationalises Norway’s position as a defence of this system. This makes their stance appear not as a political choice, but as a necessary upholding of the principles that ensure global stability.

– **I.** While not appealing to a universal identity, the minister works to solidify a specific coalition of allies. Her statement about “*actively supporting President Zelensky’s peace formula*” appeals to a shared identity among nations committed to a Ukrainian-led vision for peace.

– **A.** The minister clarifies that the call to action is conditional and principled rather than open-ended, saying that “*peace is important but on terms defined by Ukraine.*” This is a call for cooperation within a defined moral and political framework, urging partners to unite not just for peace in the abstract but for a just peace that respects the sovereignty of the victim.

5. Speech by Olaf Scholz, then-Federal Chancellor of Germany. During his 2023 address in Davos, then-Chancellor Scholz’s speech aimed to project a message of resilience and unified commitment from the international community.

– **R.** Scholz frames the present moment by creating a narrative of overcoming past crises. By reminding the audience that recent “*discussions revolved around the global economy’s path out of the pandemic,*” he rationalises the current challenges as the next step in an ongoing journey, just as the world navigated the pandemic, it can also navigate the current geopolitical crises.

– **F.** The speech begins with a conventional but essential gesture of acknowledging suffering through condolence. Scholz establishes a tone of shared humanity by saying, “*We are with their families*” about a tragic incident.

– **I.** The Chancellor emphasises a shared identity forged by a common threat. His assertion that Russia’s aggression is “*having an impact on all of us*” deliberately universalises the conflict. This transforms it from a regional European war into a global problem, creating a collective “*us*” unified by a shared sense of vulnerability and responsibility.

– **A.** Scholz issues a call for cooperation by proposing a “*Marshall plan for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine,*” which refers to a powerful historical metaphor. This frames the call to action not as a simple aid but as a large-scale and cooperative project.

6. Speech by Andrzej Duda, former President of Poland. President Duda’s address is deeply rooted in historical precedent, using Poland’s past to frame its perspective on present-day international law and conflict.

– **R.** The former President of Poland rationalises the need for contemporary alliances by grounding them in historical moral clarity. He invokes the moment when the “*anti-Hitler Coalition, including Poland, signed the Atlantic Charter,*” using a powerful historical analogy. This appeal to a respected precedent strengthens

Poland’s credibility (*ethos*) and provides a logical foundation for upholding the principles of that charter today.

– **F.** President Duda directly acknowledges the profound human cost of conflict, expressing empathy and condolences. By stating that “*hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives or suffered injuries,*” he quantifies the tragedy, giving weight to the suffering and underscoring the gravity of the aggression against Ukraine.

– **I.** The speech appeals to a shared identity by listing values such as “*the determination of nations, inviolability of borders, renunciation of violence*”, and calls on the audience to identify as a collective of nations that upholds the rules-based order.

– **A.** Duda indirectly calls to action by praising past leadership, highlighting the “*courageous and forward-looking decisions made by the leaders of the Western World*” during previous crises. This sets a high standard and implicitly calls upon current leaders to demonstrate the same courage and cooperation in their own time.

7. Speech by Katalin Novák, President of Hungary. President Novák’s speech leverages Hungary’s unique historical narrative to deliver a passionate plea for peace that aims to resonate on a universal, human level.

– **R.** The President of Hungary rationalises her country’s fervent desire for peace by invoking its national experience. The reference to “*a thousand years of turbulent history in the heart of Europe*” provides a profound historical and emotional justification (*pathos*) for Hungary’s current stance. This narrative frames their position not as a political calculation, but as a deep-seated lesson learned through centuries of suffering.

– **I.** By stating “*how precious freedom is and how painful it is to be deprived,*” Novák transcends national politics to connect on the level of shared emotion. This appeal to pathos invites every listener to identify with the fundamental values of liberty and empathy for those who have lost it.

– **A.** The call for peace is structured as a robust rhetorical expansion in her plea, “*we want peace in our country, in Ukraine, in Europe, in the world,*”. The repetition and escalating scope transform a simple desire into an urgent, universal call for collective action.

8. Speech by Zuzana Čaputová, President of Slovakia. Its speech is marked by a sense of

urgency, calling for immediate action on global security.

– **R.** The speaker justifies the need for immediate policy change by framing the current moment as a final opportunity. Her assertion that “*time for action is running out*” is a classic argument from urgency (*kairos*). This rationalises her demands by suggesting that the luxury of debate is over and cooperative action is the only logical path forward.

– **F.** The speech acknowledges the suffering of a specific victim by clearly assigning blame to the perpetrator. The statement that “*Russia’s forces have been killing innocent Ukrainian civilians*” is a direct acknowledgement of Ukraine’s pain, which serves to build solidarity and delegitimise the aggressor.

– **I.** Čaputová uses the inclusive pronoun “*we*” to forge a collective identity of actors who share the blame for inaction and the responsibility for solutions. Stating “*we aren’t doing enough*” is a form of collective self-critique that powers her assertion that “*it falls to us to deliver human-made solutions.*”

– **A.** The call to action is framed as a need for a fundamental paradigm shift. By demanding, “*We need a new agenda for peace,*” the president implies that the current frameworks have failed. This calls for leaders to collaborate on creating a new, presumably more effective, approach to resolving global conflicts.

9. Speech by Tobias Billström, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. The Swedish foreign minister’s speech is a firm and methodical indictment of Russian aggression intended to strengthen the international community’s resolve.

– **R.** Billström rationalises Sweden’s firm stance by presenting a pattern of hostile behaviour over time in citing Russia’s “*aggression in Ukraine since 2014, and in Syria since 2015,*” and using historical enumeration to frame the current conflict not as an isolated incident, but as part of a long-standing threat.

– **F.** The minister employs a subtle but powerful form of acknowledging fault through collective self-critique, admitting that the world “*did not acknowledge the signs of the times.*” This shows that lessons have been learned and suggests that the current firm stance directly results from correcting a previous strategic error.

– **I.** The speech appeals to a shared identity based on a common moral outrage. By highlight-

ing Russia’s actions of “*deliberately destroying Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure,*” Billström aims to unify the international community in solidarity with the victim.

– **A.** The call for action is framed as a necessary response to a direct global threat. The statement that “*Russia is weaponising food and exacerbating the global food crisis*” transforms the conflict’s consequences into a problem for every nation. This is a call for a broad international coalition to act not only in defence of Ukraine, but also in defence of global food security.

The findings of this study demonstrate that contemporary Western political leaders employ a consistent and identifiable toolkit of communicative tactics to pursue a strategy of reconciliation. This research aligns with other studies that place a central role on framing in political discourse. Political rhetoric, especially in national or international tensions, depends significantly on such framing to guide public opinion and avoid polarisation [4]. For instance, the repeated use of *acknowledging fault* tactics can be considered part of a wider discursive pattern of accountability in which politicians try to regain moral capital through calculated expressions of regret [10]. The application of *rationalisation* through empirical facts and precedent in history conforms to research demonstrating credibility (*ethos*) is the cornerstone of political persuasion, particularly in crises when the populace and leaders must explain their actions to the doubting masses [11]. Similarly, the widespread use of *appeal to common identity* firmly lends validity to the principles of social identity theory, which dictates that establishing a salient in-group identity is the most effective way to produce cooperation. As A. Bankert argues, political cohesion is usually achieved by basing it on a common “*us,*” which this study found to be constructed based on shared values, dangers, or national projects [12]. Also, *calls for collective action* resemble the overall trend of strategic framing of unity, where cooperation rather than blame is emphasised [13]. The findings of this research are significant for revealing modern statecraft. The prevalence of these specific tactics suggests that Western political discourse is conditioned by powerful, implicit “*discursive norms*” that shape how leaders conduct reconciliation negotiations [14]. These norms mandate using positive, forward-looking rhetoric that acknowledges problems without dwelling on blame.

Conclusions. This study has explored the framing and realisation of reconciliation strategies in contemporary Western political discourse through the analysis of official speeches by national leaders. The findings demonstrate that Western statecraft has a shared rhetorical culture for de-escalation despite deep political divides. Leaders from across the political spectrum draw from the same well of tactics, suggesting a common understanding of what constitutes effective peace-building language. Second, these findings show that modern reconciliatory discourse is a sophisticated balancing act. It combines logical arguments (*rationalisation*) with empathy (*acknowledging fault*) and unifying narratives (*appeal to shared identity*). It is a skill, not just a sentiment. For Ukraine and other nations grappling with the consequences of aggression, iden-

tifying the mechanics of genuine reconciliation in diplomatic discourse is critical for navigating a path toward a just and sustainable peace. These findings provide a concrete framework for diplomats, negotiators, and analysts to evaluate political speech's sincerity and strategic direction. They equip citizens with the tools for enhanced media literacy, enabling them to distinguish between substantive peace-building and empty rhetoric.

Future research could expand the scope of this study by examining reconciliation strategies in political speeches across non-Western or transitional democracies to explore cross-cultural variation. Additionally, quantitative analysis of stylistic features could provide deeper insights into each tactic's persuasive power and emotional resonance.

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